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Abstract
Because of the perceived risk of repression some survey questions are likely sensitive in
more autocratic countries while less so in more democratic countries. Yet, survey data
on potentially sensitive topics are frequently used in comparative research despite concerns
about comparability. In a novel approach to test the comparability of politically sensitive
questions I employ a multilevel-analysis with more than 80 000 respondents in 36 African
countries to test for systematic bias when the survey respondents believe (fear) that the
government has commissioned the survey, as opposed to an independent research institute.
The findings indicate that fear of the government induces a substantial and significant bias
on questions regarding the citizen-state relationship in more autocratic countries, but not in
more democratic countries. This has practical implications for the comparative use of survey
data.
1 Introduction
When Guineans were asked how much they trust president Alpha Conde´ in 2013, on average
45 percent said - ”A lot”. This is considered strong approval by most accounts, but is it true?
When respondents are divided into two groups, one that believes that the interviewer was
sent by the government and and one that does not, we get a di↵erent picture. Of the former
56 percent indicated ”A lot” of trust in Conde´, while in the latter group only 31 percent
shared this sentiment. In contrast, in highly democratic Ghana the di↵erence between these
two groups of respondents is only 4 percent, compared to 25 percent in considerably less
democratic Guinea1. There seems to be something going on here with respect to perceived
survey sponsor and the regime respondents live in.
It is well known that respondents tend to give untruthful answers to sensitive survey
questions due to ”social desirability bias”. If your true opinion deviates from a strong so-
cietal norm, it can be socially desirable for the respondent to misreport their true opinions
or preferences regarding sensitive issues such as sexuality, race, or income (Tourangeau and
Yan, 2007). In autocratic countries an additional set of questions are sensitive for reasons
beyond privacy and social adaption. In particular, questions regarding the citizens’ rela-
tion with, and their attitudes towards the authorities. In addition to the social desirability
not to deviate from norms, respondents subjected to autocratic rule practice ”preference
falsification” to align their answers with the perceived wishes of the regime (Kuran, 1997).
Given that authoritarian regimes often pay close attention to what their citizens do and say
in order to sanction those who challenge the o cial discourse (Linz, 2000), there is a real
risk that citizens associate public opinion surveys with government intelligence gathering.
Citizens can therefore be expected to appease the regime with their responses out of fear
that failure to do so may result in repression, physical or otherwise. In electoral systems
dominated by patronage politics, voters who fail to show their political support for the gov-
ernment may fear, not outright repression, but being excluded from patronage networks and
expected benefits (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen, 2012). To the extent that citizens practice
self-censorship in any form, and that the prevalence of this depend on the perceived risk of
repression or exclusion, responses on sensitive issues are systematically biased across coun-
tries and are therefore not comparable between countries where the perceived risks di↵ers.
Yet despite this, scholars conduct comparative studies of both the causes, and e↵ects of,
1The results summarized in this paragraph are drawn from the Afrobarometer survey round 5
(www.afrobarometer.org)
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for example, trust in government, democratic attitudes, regime support or political legiti-
macy across countries with varying regime types (cf. Gilley (2006b), Gilley (2006a), Booth
and Seligson (2009) and Moehler (2009)), where they rely on data derived through direct
questions on these (in some countries, but not in others) potentially sensitive topics. Others
simply omit suspicious outliers from their samples such as China and Vietnam where some
90 percent of respondents trust the national government ”quite a lot” or a ”great deal”
(AsianBarometer, 2008). This, however, restricts academic inquiry regarding trust in the
government to democracies and low-trust autocracies. It is di cult to say which approach
is the least problematic.
In order to test the the extent to which citizens practice self-censorship when responding
to surveys in countries where citizens’ experience di↵erent perceived (and real) risks of re-
pression, I compare responses to potentially sensitive questions from more than 80 thousand
respondents across 33 to 36 African countries, testing the interaction e↵ect of respondents
belief about the survey sponsor with the level of democracy in the respondents country, in
a multilevel design. The results indicate that questions relating to the citizen-state rela-
tionship, such as “Trust in the President or Prime Minister” or if you think democracy is
a ”preferable system” are systematically biased with the level of democracy in the country,
while apolitical questions, such as “How much do you trust your neighbors?”, are not. Thus
caution is warranted for employing the former types of survey items in comparative studies
when comparing di↵erent regime types (without using reliability weights), but not for the
latter.
2 Self-censorship and how estimate it
Survey respondents can feel the need to censor their responses if (a) it is invasive into private
matters such as sexuality or personal income; or (b) it elicit responses that can be socially
undesirable or politically incorrect; or (c) the respondent fear that their response can have
consequences if disclosed (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). As a result questions relating to, for
example, income (Chung and Monroe, 2003), voter turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010),
prejudice against other ethnic or religious groups (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens, 1997), and
drug abuse or other illegal activities (Krumpal, 2013), can cause the respondent to hide the
truth out of (a) prestige; (b) fear of social sanctioning from peers; and (c) fear of punishment.
This can lead to high rates of systematic non-responses and/or biased answers, resulting in
poor data. While (a) and (b) induce social desirability bias in surveys conducted in both
democratic and autocratic regimes alike, (c) is of greater concern in autocratic and semi-
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autocratic contexts, where the perceived risk of repression is likely to be higher. Indeed,
it has been argued that citizens subjected to authoritarian rule have strong incentives to
practice “preference falsification” (Kuran, 1997), and Schedler (1999) raises concerns about
the possibility of obtaining reliable measures of regime legitimacy through representative
public-opinion surveys or qualitative interviews in autocracies because of the opaque and
repressive features of those regimes. Fear of repression for failing to give the - from the
regime’s point of view - desired answer is expected to have an e↵ect on the responses, espe-
cially when respondents are uncertain about their anonymity.
So what does this mean for cross-country comparative studies if we are interested in,
for example, approval ratings, regime support or the legitimacy of the regime attributed
by citizens? If the levels of self-censorship are more or less equal across countries on the
proxies or components of said question or indexes, the issue is less problematic. We would
simply have to deal with either inflated or deflated numbers across the board. However, if
the propensity to self-censor depends on some traits that are heterogeneous across countries,
such as the level of democracy or political repression, the size of the bias di↵ers between
countries, and thus restricts the possibility of comparative analysis. In a comparative study
of political approval rating in 128 countries, Guriev and Treisman (2016) make an e↵ort to
account for the influence of fear by including repression in their analysis and controlling for
if leaders receive higher ratings during years of increased repression. While they find no clear
relationship between repression and approval, I would expect the e↵ects of repression to be
long lasting, especially in the absence of a regime transition. A 9 year panel may simply be
to short to pick up a variation in these e↵ects. Furthermore if a regime is prepared to use
political repression at t=1, unless there has been major political changes, it is likely that
respondents already anticipate this at t=0.
Some recent findings warrants caution for the reliability of survey responses in repres-
sive and non-democratic settings. A recent study by Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2015) in
Zimbabwe - where government repression and insecurity is commonplace - indicates that an
upward bias of survey respondents’ reported level of trust in the president and the ruling
party, is a↵ected by recent experience of state-led repression. Respondents who had experi-
enced state-led violence up to 30 days prior to being interviewed were more likely to believe
that the state had commissioned the survey (Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale, 2015). While this
suggests that a recent reminder of the regimes repressive nature will lead to inflated levels
of reported trust, it is reasonable to believe that citizens do not easily forget what kind
of regime they are subjected to and should therefore falsify their preferences (perhaps to
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a lesser degree) even if they have not experienced state sponsored violence recently. Frye
et al. (2017) employ a series of list experiments and find actual approval ratings of Russia’s
president Vladimir Putin shy of 10 percentage points below those received through direct
questioning. Also using a list experiment Kalinin (2014) finds that Russians’ electoral sup-
port for Putin is inflated with about 20 percentage points. While these results show that
approval of Putin was still staggeringly high, respondents do indeed inflate their approval
in autocratic Russia. In the Chinese context, Jiang and Yang (2016) show the increase in
preference falsification in the aftermath of a major political purge in Shanghai.
Does this mean that we cannot trust citizens’ trust in government or their political pref-
erences in general? To answer this questions we need to move away for single-country case
studies and test for a systematic bias across a larger sample of countries. To test for response
bias due to perceived fear of the government I turn to Afrobarometer data and specifically
the the very last question in the Afrobarometer that asks “By the way, who do you think sent
us to do this interview?”2. Despite that the enumerators conducting the survey introduces
themselves as a liated with “an independent research organization” which does not “repre-
sent the government or any political party”, in the 5th round of the Afrobarometer only 29
percent of the respondents considered the survey to be independent, 15 percent stated that
they did not know and the remaining 56 percent believed that the survey was sponsored
by the government. With the help of this survey question I divide respondents in to three
groups: non-suspecting (those that believe the survey to be independent); suspecting (those
that believe the government to sponsor the survey); and a don’t know group. This questions
has been featured as a proxy for the ”costliness of dissent” or ”fear of the government” in
models predicting vote choice in 16 African countries (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen, 2012)
and voting intentions in Zimbabwe (Bratton and Masunungure, 2012). In contrast to these
authors I argue that the propensity to suspect the government as sponsor of the survey in
one country is not very informative or a good proxy for political fear in that country. This is
illustrated by the fact that in the most democratic and the most autocratic countries in the
2012 sample, Cape Verde and Sudan, virtually the same percentage of respondents (46-47)
believed the government to sponsor the survey. In the full sample of 36 countries, suspecting
the government as survey sponsor is only correlated with the country’s level of democracy
at .11 level. It is clear that this variable in of itself is a poor proxy for costliness of dissent.
Instead beliefs about survey sponsorship should have an impact only to the extent that the
respondents also fear punishment from the authorities. Studying the anomaly of Ethiopians’
2I am not aware of any other survey that includes a similar question which is why I have only been able
to test my proposition in the African context
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views of democracy Mattes and Teka (2016, p. 31) note the surprising fact that respondents
who believed the state to be have ordered the survey were “less likely to state that they
feared speaking their mind about politics”. This does, however, make sense considering that
the very question about whether or not one must be careful of what you say about politics
is potentially a sensitive question itself.
In sum, suspicion of the survey sponsor should lead to preference falsification on poten-
tially sensitive topics, but not so on questions that are apolitical in nature. If you falsify your
preferences out of fear of the regime, you should be more likely to do so when you believe
the regime will learn what you say. Following the same reasoning it may increase “Don’t
know” answers on sensitive issues but should not increase refusal and drop out rates as the
latter is too blatant non-compliance3. From this I derive the following hypotheses:
• H1: Respondents who believe the government is behind the survey will answer di↵er-
ently on politically sensitive questions, compared to citizens who believe the survey to
be independent
– H1.1: this is more prevalent in more autocratic countries and less so in democratic
countries
• H2: Respondents who believe the government is behind the survey will not answer
di↵erently on non-sensitive questions, compared to citizens who believe the survey to
be independent
To get an indication if this is taking place I analyze respondents propensity to state that
they have high trust in their country’s key leader (a) if they believed (feared) that the survey
was conducted on behalf of the government, did not know, or that it was indeed carried out
by a independent research institute, and (b) the level of democracy in their country. The
level of democracy functions as a proxy of the “fear of government” mechanisms theorized to
induce self-censorship. Using more than 80 thousands observations in 34 to 36 countries for
two survey rounds, I employ multilevel logistical regressions with a set of control variables
on the country and individual level.
It should be noted that although the design can tell us something about the variation
in the level of self-censorship, a caveat is that it does not allow us to estimate the absolute
3In the Lebanese context Corstange (2014) shows that foreign sponsorship substantively increase both
refusal and drop out rates compared to university sponsorship
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level of self-censorship at hand. There is the risk that even among respondents that believe
that the survey truly is independent, self-censorship is taking place. They may still be wary
that the authorities can use the survey to trace unsanctioned opinions to an individual, a
neighborhood or a village. To the extent that respondents adopt a better-safe-than-sorry-
approach the overall response bias will be larger. This would reduce the between group
e↵ects. Thus the results reported in this paper are despite this built-in downward bias in my
estimates. Bearing in mind that the absolute levels of response bias cannot be established,
the findings do show that between-group di↵erences are clear and meaningful.
Moreover, the research design does not allow me to determine whether the e↵ects I find
stem from bias caused by believing that the government has sent the enumerator or that the
bias is caused by believing that the enumerator is from an independent organization, or from
a combination of the two. While I have strong theoretical reasons to suspect that the bias
stem form the former, especially for questions evaluating the regime, my empirical strategy
o↵ers no leverage to separate these two e↵ects. Questions relating to economic well-being,
access to food, etc. could, for example, su↵er from bias caused by the respondents’ belief
that an independent organization is more likely to be connected with development aid and
that reporting hardship will induce aid flows.
3 Data and results
In this section I briefly describe the data and present my results. Individual level data is
taken from the Afrobarometer’s 5th and 6th round (Afrobarometer, 2016). The surveys were
conducted from 20.10.11 to 04.06.13 and 01.03.14 to 22.11.15. I match the data with coun-
try level data for 2012 and 2014 from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2017b). I first and foremost base my analysis on data from the 5th and 6th round of the
Afrobarometer because those rounds allow for the highest number of respondents across the
highest number or countries, with more than 40 thousand respondents nested in 34 and 36
countries respectively. The Afrobarometer have included the question regarding perceived
survey sponsor since its 2nd round, but previous rounds cover fewer countries. However, as
a robustness check I merge Afrobarometer rounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and match them with
V-Dem data for 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2014 respectively (see Appendix A, table 7).
This full dataset provides more than 160 thousand respondents nested in 124 country years.
Dependent variables
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• Most sensitive DVs - Trust key leadership figure; Trust ruling party; Preference for
democracy; Perception of corruption in President/PM o ce
• Somewhat sensitive DVs - Trust the police; Country moving in right direction; Per-
ception of corruption in taxation agency
• Non-sensitive DV - Trust in neighbors
For the first dependent variables regarding trust in various authorities respondents indi-
cating “Not at all” or “Just a little” or “I trust them somewhat” are coded as 0, and “I trust
them a lot” are coded as 1. First this allows for a clear binary logit regression instead of
a ordnial logit. Moreover, I theorize that preference falsification (may) occur in this binary
divide. If you are in the business of falsifying your preferences you are likely looking for
the safest possible option. I acknowledge that is possible that stating that you trust the
president “somewhat” or “a lot” are safe enough in most environments, whereas “Not at
all” or “Just a little” might be sensitive in some circumstances. I therefore replicate all
model specifications using this binary divide (see Appendix A, table 9). For the variables
regarding how many in the presidents o ce/tax authorities the respondent believes are cor-
rupt, respondents indicating “All of them” or “most of them” are coded as 1, and “some of
them” and “none” are coded as 0. For preference for democracy, respondents indicating that
“Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” are coded as 1, and ”In some
circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable” or ”For someone like me,
it doesnt matter what kind of government we have” are coded as 0. For the non-sensitive
dependent variable trusting your neighbor, “Not at all” or “Just a little” are coded as 0, and
“I trust them somewhat” and “I trust them a lot” are coded as 1.
Independent variables
The main independent variable “Survey Sponsor” is generated from the questions item “Just
one more question: Who do you think sent us to do this interview?” where respondents who
indicate that they believe the enumerator was sent by the local, regional or national Gov-
ernment, or any of its agencies are coded as 1. Respondents who believed the survey to
be commissioned by a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), an University, a research
company etc. was coded as 0. Of the complete sample 54 percent of respondents reported
that they believed that the government was behind the survey, and 30 percent believed it
to be independent. 16 percent of respondents reported that they did not know. The latter
group of respondents are excluded in the main analysis but are coded as 1 together with the
”suspecting” group in robustness check of all model specifications (see Annex A, table 7 and
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8). The rational being that not knowing who the sponsor is likely also induce preference falsi-
fication in repressive settings, albeit to a lesser degree than suspecting the government. The
variance of suspecting the government as sponsor at a country level is between 30 percent
in Egypt and 75 percent in South Africa producing su ciently large number of respondents
in each category and country for analysis. Moreover this variation only correlates with the
level of democracy at .10 level.
In all model specifications I control for the following set of commonly used individual
level control variables (cf. Adida et al. (2016), Carlson (2014) and Moehler and Lindberg
(2009)): age; gender; education level; how often one discuss politics; and for urban/rural res-
idency. I purposely do not include variables which in and of themselves are sensitive items.
Whether you believe the country is “moving in the right or wrong direction”, may indeed
predict whether you trust the key leadership figure, but it may also provoke self-censorship.
Likewise the item “In your opinion, how often, in this country: do people have to be careful
of what they say about politics?” would o↵er a direct test for respondents fear, were it not
for that those that truly are fearful and that believe that the government sponsor the survey
will not answer truthfully on either item. In addition to theoretically justifying the exclu-
sion of politically sensitive items as predictors in my model specifications I run two models
with the above mentioned items as dependent variables. The results show that indeed both
are associated with similar bias as the main dependent variables, further motivating their
exclusion.
Country level
As a proxy for the perceived risk of repression at the country level I employ the Varieties
of Democracy’s Electoral Democracy Index (Teorell et al., 2016; Coppedge et al., 2017b). It’s
an aggregated index building on more than 30 fine grained sub components of: freedom of
expression and association; su↵rage; elections quality; and the election of the chief executive
(see Coppedge et al. (2017a), Coppedge et al. (2017c), Marquardt and Pemstein (2017), and
Pemstein et al. (2017) for more detail). The rationale for using a highly aggregated index
of the level of democracy is to be able to test if existing studies that draw conclusions from
comparative survey data from countries at a vastly di↵erent levels of democracy are su↵ering
from biases or not (cf. Gilley (2006a), Moehler and Lindberg (2009)). Arguably an aggre-
gated measure may be a crude proxy for a perceived risk of repression. I therefore employ
an index of freedom from political killings and torture by the government (Coppedge et al.,
2017a), in additional model specifications. Both indexes are continuous measures ranging
from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds a to a perfect Electoral Democracy, and full physical in-
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tegrity respectively.
In addition I also control for the the logged level of GDP per capita and corruption at
the country level which have been shown to predict several of the dependent variables (cf.
(Rothstein, 2011) and (Bora¨ng, Nistotskaya, and Xezonakis, 2017)). Data of GDP per capita
is taken from UN Statistics (2016). The level of corruption is an index of political corruption
comprised of expert assessments of the pervasiveness of corruption in the executive, the
legislature, the public sector and the judiciary (McMann et al., 2016; Coppedge et al.,
2017a). The index is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 no corruption and 1
complete corruption.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
sponsor (government) 155,425 0.620 0.485 0 1
sponsor (government+don’t know) 183,332 0.678 0.467 0 1
trust leader 177,392 0.365 0.482 0 1
trust police 180,688 0.255 0.436 0 1
trust ruling party 171,692 0.261 0.439 0 1
trust neighbor 52,576 0.623 0.485 0 1
country right direction 130,064 0.516 0.500 0 1
corruption president 131,777 0.322 0.467 0 1
corruption tax agency 135,946 0.434 0.496 0 1
prefer democracy 185,332 0.673 0.469 0 1
rural 185,332 0.610 0.488 0 1
female 185,332 0.501 0.500 0 1
discuss politics 183,339 0.883 0.719 0 2
education 185,327 3.284 2.129 0 9
age 183,319 36.851 14.597 18 105
gdp pc 124 7.049 0.978 5.438 9.242
electoral democracy 124 0.536 0.173 0.129 0.853
physical integrity 124 0.663 0.219 0.055 0.968
corruption 124 0.503 0.072 0.294 0.634
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Because respondents are not randomly distributed but clustered within countries, I em-
ploy a multilevel model which takes these data hierarchies into account and allows testing
the e↵ect of a two-level interaction between survey sponsor (individual level) and level of
democracy (country level). The model is a logistic random slope model. The specification
of the baseline multilevel model is as follows:
yic =  00 +  1demc +  2sponsoric +X
0
ic + Z
0
c  + U0c +R1c + ⌘ic (1)
And adding the two level interaction term between individual level suspicion of sur-
vey sponsor and country-level democracy we get the full multilevel model specification (see
Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Culpepper (2013)):
yic =  00 +  1demc +  2sponsoric +  3(demcxsponsoric) +X
0
ic + Z
0
c  + U0c +R1c + ⌘ic (2)
Where yic is the dependent variable for individual i in country c,  00 is the average in-
dividual level intercept, demc is the country-level democracy, sponsoric is an individual’s
perception of survey sponsor, X 0ic and Z
0
c are vectors of individual and country-level con-
trols, U0c is the intercept variance, R1c is the slope variance (for sponsoric), and ⌘ic is the
individual-level error term. I do not discuss nor present the slope and intercept variance
in the main text and tables. In short, the slope and intercept variance is reduced when
introducing the two-level interaction, i.e. it explains some of the between country variance
(for details please seeAppendix A table 5 ).
Because multilevel logistic regression coe cients are somewhat di cult to interpret (even
without two-level interaction terms) I proceed by graphing the interaction e↵ects (Brambor,
Clark, and Golder, 2006), and then by visualizing the e↵ects in each country expressed in
odds ratios.
3.1 Results
Table 2 summarizes the regression results from 7 generalized linear mixed models (GLMM)
for 6 di↵erent dependent variables for the 5th round of the Afrobarometer. The baseline
(model 1) is a generalized linear mixed model testing the e↵ects of the individual level pre-
dictors and the country level predictors on the propensity to indicate ”A lot” of trust in
the country’s key leadership figure. In the full sample the strongest individual predictor is
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believing the government to be behind the survey, followed by rural residency. Higher age
is associated with higher trust in the president or prime minister, while higher education
exhibit a negative relationship. Discussing politics more frequently is associated with higher
trust. In contrast to what we see in Western Europe and North America, females are less
likely than males to trust the key leader, the police, the ruling party and also their their
neighbors. On the country level higher corruption is associated with lower trust. Introducing
the cross level interaction (model 2) does not substantively change the magnitude or direc-
tion of any control variables outside of the interaction. The direction and significance of the
interaction term supports the hypothesis that respondents who believe the government to
sponsor the survey will inflate their answer on a politically sensitive question like trust in
the president or prime minister. This e↵ect is large in countries at low levels of Electoral
Democracy, and decreases with higher democracy scores. Substituting the dependent vari-
able with trust in the police (model 3) and trust in the ruling party (model 4) corroborates
that questions relating to the regime and its performance su↵er from systematic response
bias across regime types. While the interaction e↵ect does not show as significant in model
3 in the regression table there is still a significant e↵ect at lower levels of democracy which
is vizualized in the interaction graph in figure 2 below. Likewise, respondents are less likely
to indicate that they prefer democracy when they believe the survey is sponsored by the
government and when they live in a autocratic country (see figure 4). Note that in contrast
to model 1, 2 and 3 these models include Swaziland, where the item trust in key leadership
and ruling party is not asked. Model 6 show that respondents who believe the government
sponsor the survey are less likely to state that ”most” or ”all” in the presidents or prime
minister o ce are corrupt. The interaction e↵ect is not significant across the board but again
we see a smaller or no e↵ect at higher levels of democracy (see figure 5. In model 7 the sen-
sitive dependent variable is replaced by the non-sensitive item ”Trust in Neighbors”. In line
with my expectations the two groups of respondents do not answer systematically di↵erent
on non-sensitive questions, and there is no relationship with the level of Electoral Democracy.
Testing the same relationships using the 6th round of the Afrobarometer Table 3 sum-
marizes the regression results from 7 generalized linear mixed models (GLMM). We note few
di↵erences other than minor changes in the magnitude of the e↵ect, eg. the bias is somewhat
smaller for trust in the leader but larger for perception of corruption in the leader’s o ce. As
trust in neighbors was not asked in the 6th round I instead employ perceptions of corruption
among tax o cials. As expected this is less (in fact not at all) sensitive than corruption in
the president’s or prime minister’s o ce.
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These results are robust to if the dependent variables are coded “Not at all” or “Just a
little” as 0, and “I trust them somewhat” or “I trust them a lot” are coded as 1 (see Appendix
A, table 9). Furthermore, re-coding the main independent variable so that respondents who
“Do not know” who commissioned the survey are collapsed with those who believed it was
the government do not change the results (see Appendix A, table 7 and 8). The results
also hold when when the models are run using full data set, with more than 140 thousand
respondents across 124 country years (see Appendix A, table 6). It should be noted that
when changing the the level two unit of analysis from country to country years, the level two
units are no longer independent and some countries are only represented by 1 country year
while others are represented by 5 country years.
In an attempt to tease out which aspects of non democracies that induce bias on politi-
cally sensitive questions, table 4 show all models from table 2 reproduced with the Electoral
Democracy Index substituted with an index of Physical Integrity. The pattern is almost
identical and shows how the propensity to indicate high trust on sensitive questions decrease
as a function of the freedom from torture and political killings, when the respondent believe
that the survey is administrated by the authorities. And again there is no e↵ect with respects
to respondents’ stated trust in their neighbors.
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Table 2: GLMM Regression Results Round 5
Dependent variable:
trust leader trust police trust rparty dem pref corr pres trust neighb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.325⇤⇤⇤ 0.735⇤⇤⇤ 0.462⇤⇤ 0.646⇤⇤⇤  0.426⇤⇤⇤  0.347⇤⇤ 0.119
(0.057) (0.171) (0.181) (0.202) (0.142) (0.147) (0.109)
democracy 0.718 0.788 1.628⇤⇤⇤ 1.993⇤⇤⇤ 1.591⇤⇤⇤  0.894 0.089
(0.670) (0.657) (0.583) (0.575) (0.536) (0.621) (0.713)
gdp pc  0.195  0.200  0.265⇤⇤  0.392⇤⇤⇤  0.131  0.172  0.273⇤
(0.125) (0.126) (0.127) (0.102) (0.085) (0.124) (0.141)
corruption  3.849⇤⇤⇤  3.907⇤⇤  5.000⇤⇤⇤  5.760⇤⇤⇤ 2.337⇤⇤  0.227 0.470
(1.442) (1.531) (1.541) (1.294) (1.028) (1.484) (1.655)
rural 0.241⇤⇤⇤ 0.243⇤⇤⇤ 0.271⇤⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤⇤ 0.004  0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.318⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023)
age 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
education  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.113⇤⇤⇤  0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
female  0.090⇤⇤⇤  0.090⇤⇤⇤  0.082⇤⇤⇤  0.061⇤⇤  0.217⇤⇤⇤  0.039  0.118⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
discuss pol 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤  0.032⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤ 0.250⇤⇤⇤ 0.096⇤⇤⇤  0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
sponsor*  0.774⇤⇤  0.447  0.646⇤ 0.377 0.377  0.108
democracy (0.309) (0.329) (0.361) (0.263) (0.269) (0.202)
Constant 2.182⇤ 2.210⇤ 2.424⇤ 3.188⇤⇤⇤  0.490 0.896 0.181
(1.299) (1.292) (1.427) (1.018) (0.892) (1.289) (0.393)
Individuals 41,046 41,046 42,574 40,228 43,301 36,376 44,127
Countries 33 33 34 33 34 33 34
Log Likeli.  24,679  24,676  21,785  20,545  23,440  21,008  26,535
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 3: GLMM Regression Results Round 6
Dependent variable:
trust leader trust police trust ruling pres corr tax corr prefer dem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.336⇤⇤⇤ 0.560⇤⇤⇤ 0.377⇤⇤ 0.765⇤⇤⇤  0.557⇤⇤⇤  0.268  0.337⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.176) (0.169) (0.230) (0.177) (0.164) (0.133)
democracy  0.564  0.320 0.726 0.618  0.770  0.686 1.475⇤⇤⇤
(0.615) (0.626) (0.592) (0.720) (0.638) (0.501) (0.552)
gdp pc  0.206⇤  0.207⇤  0.117  0.177  0.016  0.045  0.254⇤⇤⇤
(0.122) (0.116) (0.106) (0.112) (0.107) (0.091) (0.098)
corruption  1.910  1.914  3.349⇤⇤  4.120⇤⇤⇤ 0.966 0.154 1.385
(1.505) (1.312) (1.371) (1.368) (1.295) (1.129) (1.261)
rural 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 0.334⇤⇤⇤ 0.311⇤⇤⇤  0.168⇤⇤⇤  0.160⇤⇤⇤  0.027
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
age 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤  0.001 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
education  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.100⇤⇤⇤  0.103⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.165⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
female  0.012  0.012  0.0001 0.023  0.081⇤⇤⇤  0.067⇤⇤⇤  0.243⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
discuss pol 0.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤⇤  0.014 0.109⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.287⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
sponsor*  0.418  0.193  0.753⇤ 0.731⇤⇤ 0.203 0.208
democracy (0.313) (0.300) (0.398) (0.313) (0.293) (0.239)
Constant 1.672 1.549 0.888 1.409  0.495 0.343 0.439
(1.277) (1.107) (1.083) (1.060) (1.049) (0.903) (1.002)
Individuals 44,442 44,442 44,646 41,212 39,769 41,765 45,236
Countries 36 36 36 33 35 36 36
Log Likel.  25,977  25,976  22,759  20,860  24,197  27,158  25,991
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 4: GLMM Regression Results Round 5 (Physical Integrity)
Dependent variable:
trust pres trust police trust ruling dem pref corr pres trust neighb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.324⇤⇤⇤ 0.684⇤⇤⇤ 0.514⇤⇤⇤ 0.532⇤⇤⇤  0.436⇤⇤⇤  0.317⇤⇤ 0.070
(0.057) (0.175) (0.187) (0.204) (0.151) (0.148) (0.118)
physical int. 0.868⇤ 0.867⇤ 1.459⇤⇤⇤ 1.605⇤⇤⇤ 0.944⇤  0.835⇤ 0.017
(0.505) (0.498) (0.465) (0.433) (0.483) (0.493) (0.627)
gdp pc  0.190  0.194  0.236⇤⇤  0.369⇤⇤⇤  0.090  0.182  0.251⇤
(0.120) (0.121) (0.116) (0.099) (0.093) (0.118) (0.148)
corruption  3.917⇤⇤⇤  3.972⇤⇤  4.790⇤⇤⇤  6.112⇤⇤⇤ 2.494⇤⇤  0.332 0.561
(1.474) (1.571) (1.369) (1.301) (1.109) (1.395) (1.894)
rural 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.271⇤⇤⇤ 0.285⇤⇤⇤ 0.004  0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.319⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
age 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
education  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.113⇤⇤⇤  0.116⇤⇤⇤ 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.043⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
female  0.090⇤⇤⇤  0.090⇤⇤⇤  0.082⇤⇤⇤  0.061⇤⇤  0.217⇤⇤⇤  0.039  0.119⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
discuss pol 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤  0.031⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤ 0.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.096⇤⇤⇤  0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
sponsor*  0.546⇤⇤  0.436  0.348 0.316 0.257  0.017
physical int. (0.253) (0.273) (0.292) (0.224) (0.220) (0.173)
Constant 1.985 2.046 2.001 3.198⇤⇤⇤  0.658 1.099 1.759
(1.307) (1.306) (1.267) (1.037) (0.971) (1.227) (1.639)
Observations 41,046 41,046 42,574 40,228 43,301 36,376 43,158
Countries 33 33 34 33 34 33 34
Log Likeli.  24,678  24,676  21,784  20,544  23,444  21,008  25,970
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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In order to make the interaction e↵ects more interpretable figure 1 to 6 visualize the
average marginal e↵ects of suspecting the survey to be sponsored by the government over
the full range of the Electoral Democracy Index for model 2 to 7 from table 3 and model
7 from table 2. These marginal e↵ect plots include all control variables from the respective
models. Figure 1 shows how the e↵ect of suspecting the survey sponsor on trust in the
president or prime minister decreases with an increase in the level of Electoral Democracy,
all else equal. At low levels of democracy the e↵ect is substantive and significant, whereas at
higher levels of democracy the e↵ect diminishes and is no longer significant in countries with
a level of democracy above .8. Figure 2 shows a even more pronounced pattern for ”Trust in
Ruling Party”. There is a clear autocratic trust bias with regards to stated trust in the rulers.
Figure 1: Marginal e↵ect on trust in key
leader
Figure 2: Marginal e↵ect trust in ruling
party
In the model specification where the less (but still) sensitive item ”Trust the Police” is
employed as the dependent variable we again note a tendency to inflate the reported level
of trust. As illustrated in figure 3 this bias is substantively smaller, yet significant and sys-
tematically related to the level of democracy. As expected there is no e↵ect of with regards
to the apolitical and non-sensitive item ”Trust your neighbors” (see figure 4 ). The e↵ect is
unsubstantial and insignificant across the full range of the Electoral Democracy Index.
Figure 5 and figure 6 again show that the autocratic bias is more pronounced in respon-
dents’ evaluation of the rulers than of civil servants. There is a strong and significant e↵ect
on stated perceptions about corruption in the president’s or prime minister’s o ce, while for
stated perceptions about corruption in the taxation agency less substantial and insignificant
at most levels of electoral democracy.
Figure 7 shows how respondents preference for democracy is systematically biased across
the level of democracy. Studies concerned with public demand for democracy (cf. (Mattes
and Bratton, 2007)), likely underestimate the true demand due to this downward bias in
more more autocratic countries.
Breaking down the results by country Figure 8 displays estimated e↵ects of suspecting
16
Figure 3: Marginal e↵ect on trust in police Figure 4: Marginal e↵ect on trust in neigh-
bors
Figure 5: Marginal e↵ect on corruption
pres/PM
Figure 6: Marginal e↵ect on corruption tax
agency
Figure 7: Marginal e↵ect on preference for
democracy
the government as sponsor of the survey for each country in the 6th round of the Afrobarom-
eter. The list of countries are sorted in order of their Electoral Democracy Score, from low
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to high levels of democracy. The e↵ects are expressed as the odds ratio of a respondent that
believes the government sponsor the survey to indicate ”A lot” of trust in the country’s key
leadership figure, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimates for which the confidence
intervals do not overlap with 1 (dotted line) indicate a statistically significant di↵erence
between the two respondent groups’ propensity to report a lot of trust, after controlling for
the above mentioned set of individual level predictors. In substantive terms the estimated
e↵ect in, for example Guinea, is to be interpreted as follows: suspecting respondents are
2.75 times more likely to report a lot of trust in the president compared to non-suspecting
respondents. By-and-large this plot lends credence to the autocratic trust bias hypothesis.
In countries with high levels of democracy the e↵ect is small or insignificant, and in more
autocratic countries the e↵ect is more often larger and significant. Figure 10 in Appendix
A shows the e↵ect for each of the 124 country years in the full sample, produce the same
pattern. It is noteworthy that a number of arguably very repressive regimes do not enjoy
the autocratic trust bias. Sudan stands out among the autocratic countries as respondents
who believe the government to sponsor the survey, in fact are less inclined to report high
trust in president al-Bashir. Furthermore, the variation among countries at comparable, and
comparatively high levels of Electoral Democracy is intriguing and calls for investigation into
whether this might be driven by an interaction between suspecting government as sponsor
and patronage and vote buying on the country level.
Figure 9 highlights two cases where we observe large changes over time in the propensity
to indicate ”A lot” of trust in the country’s president when the respondent suspects govern-
ment sponsorship. In Kenya there was no significant e↵ect of believing that the government
had sent the enumerator on respondents propensity to indicate high trust in the country’s
president in 2003 and 2005. In the aftermath of the 2007-08 Kenyan crisis, which saw some
1300 people dead and 600 000 people displaced following politically motivated (Kagwanja
and Southall, 2009; Rutten and Owuor, 2009), and allegedly state sponsored violence (HRW,
2008), respondents where statistically significantly and substantively (1.86 times) more likely
to indicate that they trusted president Kibaki ”A lot” when they believed that the survey
was not independent4. Breaking citizens’ trust seams to be associated with higher levels of
reported trust from the very same. In the subsequent rounds of the Afrobarometer there is
still an significant e↵ect of suspecting the survey sponsor, albeit weaker. Madagascar is the
one country in the sample with the largest decrease in Electoral Democracy Score between
2005 and 2012, from 0.53 to 0.23. Following the 2009 Malagasy political crisis which cul-
minated in the unconstitutional transfer of executive power, political repression increased
(Ploch and Cook, 2012). In line with my expectations respondents’ propensity to self-censor
has increased over this time period and in 2012 respondents believing that the government
sponsored the survey was more than twice as likely to report that they had ”A lot” of trust
in president Rajoelina. In 2013 and 2014 Madagascar’s electoral democracy score improved
to more moderate a .48 and in the most recent round of the Afrobarometer we no longer
observe a significant e↵ect between these two groups of respondents.
4Expressed in predicted probabilities, the between group di↵erence is 12 percentage points, holding the
control variables at their means
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Figure 8: Estimated e↵ects of suspecting government sponsorship on trust in key leader
across African countries in decending order of Electroal Democracy Score
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Figure 9: Estimated e↵ects of suspecting government sponsorship on trust in key leader in
Kenya and Madagascar
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4 Discussion
This paper shows that the e↵ects of respondents’ belief of who administrates the survey sub-
stantially influence answers on politically sensitive questions in more autocratic countries,
and less so in more democratic countries. I want to point out that, while the estimated ef-
fects are already large to cause concern for the comparability of the particular survey items,
I am if anything underestimating the true e↵ects, because even respondents who believe the
enumerator to be from a independent research organization may adopt a adopt a better-safe-
than-sorry-approach out of fear that the authorities can use the survey to trace unsanctioned
opinions to an individual, a neighborhood or a village.
To summarize, sensitive questions evaluating the ruler/s su↵er from a larger bias than do
questions evaluating those exercising public power. This is evident by the the larger e↵ect
for trust in the key leadership figure or ruling party compared to trust in the police, as well
as by the di↵erence in the e↵ect on stated perceptions of corruption in the president/prime
minister’s o ce and in the tax authorities. The innocuous question about trust in your
neighbors provides perfect a placebo test for the Autocratic Trust Bias hypothesis as one
would expect no di↵erence between the two groups of respondents’ answers, no matter the
level of political repression. Indeed there is none.
The usefulness of an survey item probing for the respondents sense of anonymity should be
evident, and ideally added to surveys with the ambition to be comparable across countries
where the doubt of anonymity are likely to produce di↵erent response behavior. Is the
solution then simply to drop the ”fearful” respondents from any comparative analysis of
sensitive items? For a number of reasons relating to the representativeness of the sample
that would be a bad idea. Having estimated the bias for a set of sensitive items, one avenue
forward would be to construct reliability weights to enable the researcher to account for the
biases in the analysis.
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A Appendix A
Figure 10 shows the e↵ect of suspecting the survey sponsor on trust in the key leadership fig-
ure for all 124 country years. Sorted from most autocratic on top down to most democratic.
Again, in general in more democratic settings there is either a non significant small e↵ect and
in more autocratic settings the e↵ect is more often significant and oftentimes substantial.
Several arguably very repressive regime does not enjoy the autocratic trust bias. Notably
in 2012, four of these Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are not only geographically and
culturally distinct from the larger sample but, were also a↵ected by the Arab Spring. It is
possible that the rebellious moods increased respondents propensity to speak truth to power.
Table 6 show that results also hold when when the models are run using full data set,
with more than 140 thousand respondents across 124 country years. Note that when chang-
ing the the level two unit of analysis from country to country years, the level two units are no
longer independent and some countries are only represented by 1 country year while others
are represented by 5 country years.
In Table 7 and table 8 the main independent variable is re-coded so that both respon-
dents that suspect the government to sponsor the survey as well as those that do not know
are coded as 1. Save for that the e↵ect sizes decreases marginally the results are identical to
those reported in table 2 and table 3. The smaller e↵ect sizes are to be expected given that
not knowing the survey sponsor in all likelihood is a ”weaker treatment” than believing that
it is the government.
Table 9 reports the results from the round 6 of the Afrobarometer with the main depen-
dent variables re-coded so that trusting “somewhat” or “a lot” is coded as 1, and “Not at
all” or “Just a little” are coded as 0. The e↵ects are substantively smaller yet still significant.
This could be indicative of that respondents indeed are more likely to pick the safest possible
option (i.e. “a lot”) when believing the government is behind the survey - when falsifying
your preferences you might as well do it fully.
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Figure 10: E↵ect of sponsor on trust in key leader round 2-6
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Table 5: GLMM Regression Results Round 6 - including slope and intercept variance
Dependent variable:
trust leader trust police trust rparty corr pres corr tax dem pref
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.336⇤⇤⇤ 0.560⇤⇤⇤ 0.377⇤⇤ 0.765⇤⇤⇤  0.557⇤⇤⇤  0.268  0.337⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.176) (0.169) (0.230) (0.177) (0.164) (0.133)
democracy  0.564  0.320 0.726 0.618  0.770  0.686 1.475⇤⇤⇤
(0.615) (0.626) (0.592) (0.720) (0.638) (0.501) (0.552)
sponsor*  0.418  0.193  0.753⇤ 0.731⇤⇤ 0.203 0.208
democracy (0.313) (0.300) (0.398) (0.313) (0.293) (0.239)
individual cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.672 1.549 0.888 1.409  0.495 0.343 0.439
(1.277) (1.107) (1.083) (1.060) (1.049) (0.903) (1.002)
Random intercept (var) 1.672 1.549 0.888 1.409  0.495 0.343 0.439
(1.277) (1.107) (1.083) (1.060) (1.049) (0.903) (1.002)
Random slope (var) 1.672 1.549 0.888 1.409  0.495 0.343 0.439
(1.277) (1.107) (1.083) (1.060) (1.049) (0.903) (1.002)
Observations 44,442 44,442 44,646 41,212 39,769 41,765 45,236
Countries 36 36 36 33 35 36 36
Log Likelihood  25,977.6  25,976.8  22,759.2  20,860.4  24,197.6  27,158.7  25,991.4
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01 Individual-level controls include: gender, age,
rural, discuss politics. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged) and corruption.
Table 6: GLMM Regression Results Round 2-6
Dependent variable:
trust leader trust police trust rparty prefer dem corr pres corr tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.281⇤⇤⇤ 0.664⇤⇤⇤ 0.564⇤⇤⇤ 0.692⇤⇤⇤  0.373⇤⇤⇤  0.340⇤⇤⇤  0.245⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.098) (0.113) (0.117) (0.076) (0.100) (0.091)
democracy 0.642 0.885⇤⇤ 1.527⇤⇤⇤ 1.656⇤⇤⇤ 1.104⇤⇤⇤  1.088⇤⇤⇤  1.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.464) (0.442) (0.408) (0.462) (0.299) (0.406) (0.344)
sponsor*  0.696⇤⇤⇤  0.628⇤⇤⇤  0.696⇤⇤⇤ 0.319⇤⇤ 0.414⇤⇤ 0.273⇤
democracy (0.171) (0.195) (0.200) (0.135) (0.176) (0.161)
individual cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.904 0.785  0.316 1.328⇤  0.757  0.429 0.937
(1.042) (0.775) (0.729) (0.771) (0.555) (0.725) (0.745)
Observations 145,358 145,358 147,910 140,986 150,646 111,090 114,434
Country years 123 123 124 120 124 106 108
Log Likel.  84,398  84,390  72,535  71,710  85,772  65,178  73,853
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01 Individual-level controls include: gender, age,
rural, discuss politics. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged) and corruption
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Table 7: GLMM Regression Results Round 6 (alternative IV)
Dependent variable:
alot trust alot policetrust alot rulptrust dem pref corr pres corr tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
sponsor 0.292⇤⇤⇤ 0.527⇤⇤⇤ 0.362⇤⇤ 0.645⇤⇤⇤  0.364⇤⇤⇤  0.498⇤⇤⇤  0.236⇤
(gov+dont know) (0.057) (0.181) (0.162) (0.240) (0.130) (0.157) (0.142)
democracy  0.580  0.344 0.728 0.578 1.436⇤⇤⇤  0.761  0.680
(0.601) (0.657) (0.586) (0.735) (0.554) (0.638) (0.505)
sponsor(gov+dk)*  0.439  0.221  0.619 0.143 0.675⇤⇤ 0.156
democracy (0.321) (0.287) (0.416) (0.233) (0.278) (0.253)
individual cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country cont. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.535 0.408 0.959 1.370 0.346  0.488 0.382
(1.074) (0.926) (1.047) (1.224) (1.046) (1.071) (0.964)
Observations 50,989 50,989 51,217 47,167 52,118 44,890 47,293
Log Likelihood  29,865  29,865  26,404  24,065  30,322  27,355  30,704
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01 Individual-level controls include: gender, age,
rural, discuss politics. Country-level controls include GDP per capita (logged) and corruption
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Table 8: GLMM Regression Results Round 5 (Alternative IV)
Dependent variable:
trust leader trust police country eval trust neighbor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sponsorDK 0.317⇤⇤⇤ 0.607⇤⇤⇤ 0.600⇤⇤⇤ 0.345⇤⇤⇤ 0.058
(0.024) (0.076) (0.079) (0.067) (0.065)
democracy 0.554 0.942 1.404⇤⇤ 1.260⇤ 0.169
(0.708) (0.716) (0.631) (0.732) (0.710)
rural 0.245⇤⇤⇤ 0.248⇤⇤⇤ 0.302⇤⇤⇤ 0.185⇤⇤⇤ 0.336⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
age 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
education  0.110⇤⇤⇤  0.110⇤⇤⇤  0.115⇤⇤⇤  0.002  0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
female  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.072⇤⇤⇤  0.056⇤⇤  0.070⇤⇤⇤  0.119⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
discuss pol 0.062⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤  0.016 0.033⇤⇤ 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
sponsorDK*  0.562⇤⇤⇤  0.603⇤⇤⇤  0.432⇤⇤⇤  0.032
democracy (0.139) (0.145) (0.124) (0.124)
Constant  1.135⇤⇤⇤  1.336⇤⇤⇤  1.964⇤⇤⇤  0.628 0.155
(0.393) (0.397) (0.347) (0.400) (0.387)
Observations 47,754 47,754 49,614 46,830 50,456
Countries 33 33 34 34 34
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
30
Table 9: GLMM Regression Results Round 6 (Recoded DV)
Dependent variable
trust leader trust police trust ruling party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sponsor 0.270⇤⇤⇤ 0.484⇤⇤ 0.271⇤ 0.401⇤
(0.068) (0.214) (0.145) (0.216)
democracy  0.632  0.488 0.160 0.279
(0.638) (0.648) (0.573) (0.642)
gdp pc  0.062  0.061 0.084  0.050
(0.121) (0.122) (0.113) (0.107)
corruption  0.113  2.283⇤  1.720
(1.436) (1.379) (1.364)
rural 0.231⇤⇤⇤ 0.231⇤⇤⇤ 0.316⇤⇤⇤ 0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
age 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
education  0.030⇤⇤⇤  0.030⇤⇤⇤  0.061⇤⇤⇤  0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
female 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.078⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
discuss pol  0.014  0.014  0.003 0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
sponsor*  0.400  0.252  0.288
democracy (0.380) (0.258) (0.374)
Constant 0.752 0.611 0.333 0.625
(1.211) (0.917) (1.165) (1.081)
Observations 44,442 44,442 44,646 41,212
Log Likelihood  27,313.020  27,312.480  28,696.310  26,388.980
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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